Abstract. The rural water pollution problems has become the obstacles to the construction of new rural areas and the integration process of urban and rural areas. Aiming at the environmental problems. From the point of view of game theory. This article analyzed the actual decision-making behavior of government supervision and farmers pollution control, government supervision and pollution control of township enterprises in process of rural water pollution control, explored the causes of water pollution in rural areas. Based on an in-depth analysis of the result of the game, it puts forward some suggestions about rural water pollution control.
Introduction
In the process of rural economic development, a large number of industrial, domestic, poultry farming waste and other waste caused serious damage to the ecological environment in rural areas. Among them, the pollution of rural water bodies is particularly prominent in the rural environmental pollution. It directly threatens the health of farmers, restricts the development of rural economy and the smooth progress of environmental protection.
In the field of water pollution control in rural areas. In 2015, Weixing Wu summarized the main patterns of water pollution in rural areas of Guangxi from 4 aspects [3] . In 2016, The development of water pollution control policy in rural areas of China has been roughly divided into 3 stages by Zhifeng Tong [6] . In 2015, Liping Wang reviewed the use of game theory in solving the conflict of water resources [4] . In 2013, Ping Lai using differential game method, proved that the 22 alliance model is more in line with the practice of watershed management [7] . In 2011, Wanhua Huang studied the influence mechanism of competition between local governments on ecological security in the process of water pollution control [8] .
The scholars' researches are mostly about how the game within the governments, enterprise and the game between governments and enterprises will affect the management of water pollution. However, the impact of farmers on water pollution control is relatively small. So, in order to fully reflect the actual situation of rural water pollution control, we not only study the game between government and township enterprises, but also consider the game between government and farmers. At the same time, we also consider various factors which will influence the game model.
Game Model of Water Pollution Control in Rural Areas

Model Basic Assumptions and Variable Design
The waste water produced by the farmers is by life, the waste water produced by the township enterprises is by industrial production. So, this paper analyzes the game between the government and farmers, the government and the township enterprises respectively. Assumptions are as follows:
(1) Assume there are three participants: farmers, township enterprises, and government (the government here is a relatively broad concept, it represents the interests of the public).
(2) Government, farmers and township enterprises are rational "economic man".
The government choose to check or not to check the situation of rural water pollution control, farmers choose to improve or not to improve the emission of rural waste, township enterprises choose to govern or not to govern rural water pollution.
(4) The completion of water pollution control objectives (the results of water quality inspection as a reference) is the only standard to measure the degree of water pollution control work of government, farmers and township enterprises. In order to further study the interaction and relationship between government, farmers and township enterprises in the rural water pollution control, we made a further variable design:
(1) J is the government's incentive to farmers who choose to improve; H is the government's incentive to township enterprises who choose to govern.
(2) C 1 is the inspection cost of the government to obtain information on farmers; C 2 is the inspection cost of the government to obtain information on township enterprises.
(3) S 1 is the social welfare of farmers to choose to improve; S 2 is the social welfare of township enterprises choose to govern.
(4) E 1 is a loss of social welfare of farmers choose not to improve; E 2 is a loss of social welfare of township enterprises choose not to govern.
(5) D is the time cost and loss of convenience in life for farmers to choose to improve. B is the cost of township enterprises in the treatment of water pollution.
(6) F is the punishment of the farmers when it were found to choose not to improve. The probability of being found is r 1 (the probability is 50%).
(7) W is the punishment of the township enterprises when it were found to choose not to govern. The probability of being found is r 2 (the probability is 50%).
(8) R is a loss of social image and reputation of township enterprises.
The Game between Government and Farmers
The probability of government inspection is p, the probability of not checking is 1-p. The probability of farmer improvement is q, the probability of not improving is 1-q. Based on the above assumptions, the game matrix of government and farmers in rural water pollution control was established. As shown in table 1: Table 1 . Game matrix between government and farmers in rural water pollution control.
When farmers choose to improve, because S 1 -J-C 1 <S 1 , the government chooses not to check; when the government choose not to check, because -D<0, the farmers chooses not to improve.
When farmers choose not to improve, if r 1 F>C 1 , the government chooses to check; otherwise, the government chooses not to check. At this time the game both sides can get a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (no inspection, no improvement).
When the government chooses to check, if J-D>-r 1 F, the farmers choose to improve. Otherwise, the farmers choose not to improve, at this time, if also meet r 1 F>C 1, then the game both sides can get a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (inspection, no improvement).
There is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the rural water pollution control. Here we analyze the game of the two sides of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
The government's expected return is:
(1) The first order condition for the maximum profit of the government is:
The farmer's expected return is:
The first order condition for the maximization of the expected benefit of farmers is:
F+J is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in the game of government and farmers. It shows that when the probability of improvement of farmers is q * <r 1 F-C 1 / r 1 F+J, the government's optimal strategy is to check; conversely, the optimal policy is not checked. When the probability of inspection of government is p * <D/ r 1 F+J, the optimal strategy of the farmer is not improved; on the contrary, the optimal strategy is to improve.
Because dq * /dr 1 >0, dp * /dr 1 <0. So, as the r 1 increases, the probability(q) that farmers choose to improve will increase; conversely, the probability(q) that farmers choose to improve will reduce. At the same time, the greater the probability(r 1 ) that the farmers are found to choose not to improve in an inspection, the number of government inspections will be less, on the contrary, the number will be more.
Because dq
. So, the greater the punishment(F) for farmers who hasn't improved, the lower the cost(C 1 ) of government inspection, the greater the probability that farmers will finish rural water pollution control work. The smaller the probability of farmers to complete rural water pollution control work, the greater the government's incentive(J) to farmers who has finished the target.
Because dp * /dD>0, dp * /dF<0, dp * /dJ<0. So, the greater the probability of government inspection, the higher the input cost(D) of farmers. However, the greater the government's incentive(J) to farmers whose rural water pollution control work completed well, the greater the punishment(F) for farmers who hasn't improved the way of rural waste discharge, the smaller the probability of government inspection on rural water pollution control.
The Game between Government and Township Enterprises
The probability of government inspection is α, the probability of not checking is 1-α. The probability of township enterprises governance is ߚ, the probability of not governance is 1-ߚ.
Based on the above assumptions, the game matrix of government and township enterprises in rural water pollution control was established. As shown in table 2: Table 2 . Game matrix between government and township enterprises in rural water pollution control. government township enterprise governance no governance
When township enterprises choose to govern, because S 2 -C 2 -H<S 2 , the government chooses not to check; when the government chooses not to check, because -B < 0, the township enterprises choose not to govern.
When township enterprises choose not to govern, if r 2 W>C 2 , then the government chooses to check; otherwise, the government chooses not to check. At this time the game both sides can get a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (no inspection, no governance).
When the government chooses to check, if H-B>-r 2 W-R, the township enterprises choose to govern. Otherwise, the township enterprises choose not to govern, at this time, if meet r 2 W>C 2, the game both sides can get a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (inspection, no governance).
There is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the rural water pollution control work. Here we analyze the game of the two sides of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
The first order condition for the maximum profit of the government is:
The expected income of township enterprises is:
(10) The first order condition for the maximization of the expected benefit of township enterprises is: 2 W+H+R is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in the game of government and township enterprises. It shows that when the probability of governance of township enterprises is ߚ * <r 2 W-C 2 /r 2 W+H, the government's optimal strategy is to check; conversely, the optimal policy is not checked. When the probability of inspection of government is ߙ * <B/r 2 W+H+R , the optimal strategy of township enterprises is not governance; on the contrary, the optimal strategy is governance.
Because dߚ * /dr 2 >0, dߙ * /dr 2 <0. So, as the r 2 increases, the probability(ߚ ) that township enterprises choose to govern will increase; conversely, the probability(ߚ) that township enterprises choose to govern will reduce. At the same time, the greater the probability(r 2 ) that the township enterprises are found to choose not to govern in an inspection, the number of government inspections will be less, on the contrary, the number will be more.
Because dߚ
. So, the greater the punishment(W) for township enterprises who hasn't controlled, the lower the cost(C 2 ) of government inspection, the greater the probability that township enterprises will finish rural water pollution control work. The smaller the probability of township enterprises to complete rural water pollution control work, the greater the government's incentive(H) to township enterprises who has finished the target.
Because dߙ
. Therefore, the greater the probability of government inspection, the higher the input cost(B) of township enterprises. However, the greater the government's incentive(H) to township enterprises whose rural water pollution control work completed well, the greater the punishment(W) for township enterprises who hasn't controlled, the more attention of the township enterprises to the social image and reputation(R), the smaller the probability of government inspection on rural water pollution control.
Policy Suggestion
From above we can see that the measures of rural water pollution control must be diversified and comprehensive. We give the following suggestions:
(1) Measures must be taken to promote all levels of government to treat rural water pollution seriously. Because -D<0, -B<0, when the government's strategy is not checked, the optimal strategy of farmers, township enterprises is not governance. At this point will reach the most unfavorable to rural water pollution control of the two equilibria (-D, 0), (-B, 0). That is, the government does not check, farmers do not govern; the government does not check, township enterprises do not govern.
Thus, it is necessary to develop appropriate measures to regulate the behavior of the government, strengthen the construction of rural water pollution control professional team for the smooth progress of rural water pollution control.
(2) Establishing the reward and punishment system to meet the requirements of Scientific Outlook on Development. Scientific Outlook on Development requires a certain range of water resources that can meet the needs of contemporary people, while not endangering the ability of future generations to meet their needs. Current performance evaluation is based on the growth of GDP, this assessment criteria too concerned about the completion of various economic indicators, ignoring the protection of the environment. So, it is necessary to design a scientific reward and punishment system, this system should be as an important basis for the assessment of whether the government, farmers, township enterprises completed the rural water pollution control work.
(3) Vigorously develop science and technology related to water pollution control. From the game results q * =r 1 F-C 1 /r 1 F+J, ߚ * =r 2 W-C 2 /r 2 W+H can be seen: the larger the probability(r 1 ) that farmers are found to choose not to improve, the smaller the government's inspection cost(C 1 ), the greater the probability that farmers will achieve rural water pollution control; the larger the probability(r 2 ) that township enterprises are found to choose not to govern, the smaller the government's inspection cost(C 2 ), the greater the probability that township enterprises will achieve rural water pollution control. To improve r 1 , r 2 ; reduce C 1 , C 2 . We must develop technologies and equipment related to water pollution control; improve government inspection methods, improve government inspection means.
(4) Establishing public participation system with information disclosure. From the game results ߙ * =B/r 2 W+H+R can be seen: the more attention of the township enterprises to the social image and reputation(R), the more attention will be paid to water pollution control. Water pollution can't rely solely on government, township enterprises, farmers, public participation is also very important. Whether the transparency of information has a great impact on the results of the game. Therefore, in the process of rural water pollution control, the more transparent the information of government, township enterprises, the more likely they are control water pollution.
Conclusions
Rural water pollution control is a complex project, which involves the interests of the government, township enterprises, farmers. In the process of water pollution control in rural areas, in order to safeguard their own interests, there must be a game between stakeholders. In order to better coordinate the interests between the stakeholders, so as to better solve the problem of rural water pollution, we study the game between government and township enterprises, government and farmers. On the basis of in-depth analysis of these game behavior, we found that the smooth progress of water pollution control in rural areas also need relevant policies and measures.
